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Abstract 
The Animal that was named, categorized, and excluded from the human 
community by the Greeks has seeped into society at multiple points.  This Animal
now exists in a paradoxical limbo where she is both excluded from social standing 
and moral consideration while at the same time being included, utilized and
discussed within all sectors of society from advertising to philosophy, neuroscience 
to the pet industry, religion to farming. Thus, animals have been caught up in 
multiple mechanisms of explanatory terminology, symbolic use, and physical 
captivity which all work together to create a Discourse of the Animal, which is 
employed both by those who seek to justify animal use and those who advocate
animal liberation.  This paper offers a speculative reflection on the development 
and deployment of the Discourse of the Animal, its reliance on western notions of
political subjectivity, and suggests that the biological lives of particular beings 
invite us beyond discourse to new, though perhaps costly, conceptions of liberation 
for all beings. 
Essay 
When I was eight or nine years old, I used to pan for gold in the 
ankle-deep creek behind my childhood house. For some reason I was 
sure there was gold in the creek bed, so I’d dig down to the sandy 
bottom with my screen-bottomed pan, scoop up a pile of dirt and 
pebbles, and come up shaking the pan back and forth. First the water 
slipped through the holes, then the tiniest sand fell through, until I 
was only left with the larger stones. Not gold, to my disappointment, 
but some lovely stones nonetheless. 
One reason for my frustrated efforts was that I didn’t know 
anything about gold. I didn’t know where or how to look for it, but 
had merely mimicked an idea born in my imagination by some movie
or story about a traveler heading west to pan for the shiny nuggets in 
the waters of the California foothills. 
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Our quest to understand animals strikes me as similar. Each of 
us has inherited certain premises about animals: What family they 
belong to, what we can expect from them, how we can use them, how 
they define our own humanity, and what roles they can play in our 
lives. Unfortunately, my finding gold in the shallow Midwestern creek
behind my house was as unlikely as my understanding the real 
biological life, particularity and needs of the cartooned animals that 
filled my storybooks, whose faces decorated my clothing, who sat in a 
cage with a spinning wheel on my shelf, or who showed up on my 
plate in a faceless form. I had always loved animals, or so I thought, 
but it has taken me over three decades to realize that what I loved
might have been nothing more than stones, water and sand. The gold,
I’m afraid, still remains quite elusive. 
And I’m beginning to wonder if the real gold of the so-called 
“Animal,”—the singular word observed by philosopher Jacques 
Derrida to denote “all the living things that man does not recognize 
as his fellows, his neighbors, or his brothers,”—remains just as 
hidden from the animal rights movement as a whole (Derrida 2008, 
34). I ask this question because it seems as if those who want to 
justify the exploitation of animal life as well as those who demand its 
liberation are all gathered around the same screen-bottomed pan, as I
was long ago, searching for something that exists elsewhere. 
The creek bed that these different factions share in common is 
the version of the Animal constructed by the Greeks. This Animal is 
fundamentally different than human mammals and this distinction
has played a crucial role in western society, religion and ethics, in 
order to describe human development, human purpose and human 
uniqueness. 
Though there were a wide variety of Greek perspectives on 
animal life and its shared relationship with human existence, the 
dominant views that shaped western science, philosophy and 
theology emphasized sharp distinctions between human and animal 
predominantly regarding reason, soul and language (Saelid Gilhus 
2006). 
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Aristotle created a hierarchy based on reason, by which higher 
humans could use lower plants and animals in any way they saw fit. 
The Stoics also emphasized the higher faculties of humans while
denying animals the power of reason, and thus the ability to 
participate in social contracts and relationships of responsibility. This
denial fit easily into Jewish and Christian narratives of dominion and 
justice, which affirmed the uniqueness of humans made in the image 
of God, while designating the rest of the soul-less biological world for 
human use (Sorabji 1993). Descartes’ logic built upon these 
foundations, asserting that because animals could not speak, they 
could not reason, and therefore could not have a soul. Per Descartes, 
animals were pure automatons, machines without feeling or thought, 
utterly different from human life, who could be used without regard. 
With a pan full of this Greek inheritance—and all the subjugation
and control that it has led to for animals in agriculture, biological 
research, food, fashion, entertainment and as family companions— 
it’s no wonder that many people in different disciplines with different
motivations began shaking the pan back and forth, certain that there 
was something more to this version of the Animal handed down to 
them. And it’s no surprise that some of the key insights crucial for 
breaking down the fortified wall between humans and animals came 
from those people who participated in institutions that were 
dependent on the subjugation, classification, coercion, ownership 
and caging of animals. 
For example, biologists who relied upon the Greek classification 
system of phyla in order to categorize organisms according to 
structure, function and growth, also endorsed Darwin’s narrative of 
co-evolution, which blurred, if not removed, any rigid line between 
species. Thus, biologists who were originally dependent upon a line of 
separation began to dismantle that same line as their learning 
progressed . 
Animal behaviorists, whose research often depended upon the 
capture and observation of other beings, began erasing the line 
between the Animal and humans as they observed how tool use, 
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language, social politics, altruism, morality and the presence of an 
emotional life exists in multiple species (de Waal 2007, Bekoff 2007).
Farmers and ranchers, who had spent years breeding, raising
and slaughtering farm animals began seeing the similarities between 
themselves and members of their herds and flocks, in terms of their 
ability to experience physical pain and emotional distress (Lyman 
and Merzer 2001, Latham and Mason 2008, Newberry and Swanson 
2008). 
Philosophers, who were the direct descendants of Greek 
metaphysics, including the separation of the Animal from humans, 
began applying their deductive and inductive skills to the 
environment, and multiple disciplines emerged such as ecofeminism, 
deep ecology, environmental studies, posthumanism and process 
thought, which sought ways to bring animals back into a balanced 
relation with the human community as well as the rest of the 
environment. 
Religious adherents, whose own communal history often 
depended upon a stark line between the Animal and human, began 
questioning this line as a valid criteria for inclusion into the spiritual 
community, and set about reinterpreting and mining their texts and 
traditions for fresh ethical mandates by which to engage 
contemporary relationships between human and animals (Waldau 
and Patton 2006). 
Neuroscientists, whose discoveries frequently depended on 
invasive studies into the bodies and brains of other animals, began to 
realize that interacting with animals positively affected human well-
being through decreased blood pressure (Baun, et al 1984); reduced 
anxiety levels for those with psychiatric disorders (Barker and 
Dawson 1998); improved psychological well-being of institutionalized
elderly (Colombo, et al 2004); stress reduction in healthcare 
professionals (Barker, et al 2005); resilience to trauma within 
families as well as enrichment for family and couples therapy (Walsh 
2009). 
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The rise of companion animals, which depended on the capture, 
taming, transport, and genetic modification of animal life, has also 
created a locus of blurred identity. Animals are now firmly 
established in human homes and families, sleeping on human beds, 
traveling in automobiles, and even going to the workplace. 
The great paradox of the well-defined line erected by the Greeks, 
by which animal life was captured and controlled, was that it led to 
circumstances of proximity and intimacy that undermined absolute 
distinctions between species and identities. To return to the 
metaphor, the firm distinction excluding animal life from human 
existence at the bottom of the creek bed, when scooped up in the 
screen-bottomed pan, began falling through the holes. As people 
began sifting through the ontological premises of fundamental 
difference, hierarchy and unimpeded use derived from the dominant 
Greek views, versions of the Animal were slipping through the screen 
at every point. The alleged line was not a physical barrier at all, but a 
site around which a Discourse of the Animal began to develop in 
myriad ways. 
French philosopher, historian, and sociologist Michel Foucault 
lends insight to this phenomena in his analysis of the Discourse of 
Sexuality. According to Foucault, what made sexuality taboo was not 
a firm barrier of exclusion that effectively silenced sexuality’s 
influence, but rather “lines of penetration” that “provided places of
maximum saturation” (Foucault 1990, 47). According to Foucault, 
17th century bourgeois society made an attempt to control sex at the 
level of speech and minimize its public discussion. However, this 
effort actually intensified the discourse on sex. 
Religious confessionals began hearing details, not just about 
sexual acts, but also desires, thoughts and dreams which were now 
brought into discourse. Sex became a subject for rational study, 
classified and understood as statistical phenomena. The sex lives of 
citizens became part of public welfare in terms of population 
assessments, birth rates, fertility and illegitimate births. Children’s 
sexuality took on new importance and schools began teaching sex 
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education as well as separating children by gender and enforcing 
curfews. Additionally, the crude discourse that had previously been 
used to discuss sex was replaced by a number of complex discourses
that required expertise and technical language, including medical, 
psychological, or legal terminology, that placed stricter controls on 
the subject matter while categorizing new levels of trespass and 
perversion along with treatment and punishment. 
If we take this description of modern sexuality as an instructive, 
if unexpected, starting point for evaluating the removal of the Animal
from the sphere of human life—as initiated by the Greeks—we see 
that this line of exclusion also allows multiple points of entry while 
necessitating further types of explanatory discourse. By excluding the
Animal from the realm of human life and moral consideration, the 
Greeks and their progeny actually created multiple lines of 
penetration whereby versions of the Animal crept into human society 
at numerous points. 
The more the Animal (or sexuality per Foucault) was supposedly 
excised from human socio-biological life, the more its influence 
permeated every turn of that life in the form of symbolic discourse. 
Perhaps because of its exclusion, the Animal became a subject of 
interest for multiple disciplines from farming to biology, philosophy 
and religion to neuroscience and the pet industry. And gradually the 
symbolic presence of animals seeped into every aspect of visible 
culture. 
The Animal was behind bars in zoos and caged in classrooms.
She was in circuses, on advertising billboards and mascots for sports 
teams, political parties and fraternal organizations. The Animal was 
displayed on cable television shows and in animated cartoons. The 
body of the Animal was utilized to test drugs, household cleaners and 
surgical techniques. Magazines were developed for pet lovers and 
breeders. Recipes were collected and transmitted to those who liked 
to cook the Animal’s flesh. Veterinarian practices became ubiquitous. 
The Animal was bred and slaughtered as part of 4-H county fairs, and
displayed by children for prizes. Animal health insurance industries
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developed. Animal rescue and advocacy organizations became more
prevalent as did interest in animal chaplaincy and animal philosophy 
courses. Children’s books, fables, songs, stuffed toys and video games
depicted the Animal. Clothing and footwear was marked with animal 
images as well as being made of flesh, fur or feathers. The science-
fiction-esque magnitude of the modern meat, egg and dairy 
industries, along with the influence of food culture, made the Animal 
and her flesh and fluids an unquestioned part of consumer society. 
The Animal who had been excluded by the Greeks now existed 
on and as our clothing, shoes, belts, bags and hats. She was in our 
entertainment, within our homes, families, educational systems, 
political and environmental agendas, and on our plates. The excluded
Animal was now utilized to sell virtually every idea under the sun, 
including the consumption and exploitation of her own flesh. 
This Animal that exists all around us is a reflection of what 
remains atop the screen as excluded and what slips through as part of
the Discourse of the Animal that surrounds our lives at every turn.
Both the rocks remaining atop and the water, sand, and grit falling 
through the screen compose the Animal that is captured in an 
imaginary line of exclusion around which, claims Foucault, a 
“multiplicity of discourses” and “manifold mechanisms which, in the 
areas of economy, pedagogy, medicine, and justice,” (to name but a 
very few), “incite, extract, distribute and institutionalize” an 
“immense verbosity” that captures the Animal (Foucault 1990, 33). 
While the gold of actual animal life still eludes us, the Discourse 
of the Animal surrounds us on all sides of the screen as excluded or 
included in particular ways suitable to human society. Around the 
screen are gathered those who want to justify the ongoing 
exploitation of the Animal and its exclusion from ethical debate, as 
well as those who demand its liberation or, at the very least, some 
measures for including it in moral considerations. We have technical 
ways to talk about the Animal, formal ways to study her, to argue over
her, to justify her captivity or demand her freedom, using 
surprisingly similar language; a similar understanding whether we 
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want to eat the animal or venerate her. This tug of war proliferates 
the Discourse of the Animal by adding new lines of penetration and 
language that rest upon and perpetuate certain accepted premises. 
One of those premises in western society is the understanding of 
a political subject with personal power, a characteristic differentiated 
from other philosophical and theological worldviews (Mill 1913). The 
political subject is often seen as a particular individual who can rise 
above their community and ecosystem, like a child who leaves his 
family in the dust. He can pursue life, liberty and happiness; he is 
capable of participating in political and juridical responsibility. He is 
seemingly unencumbered by the actual cycles of life although he has 
classified and categorized its appearances. 
In addition to being merely political, he can pursue spiritual 
enlightenment by dissociating from his surroundings and aspiring 
toward a God’s eye view, as from outside, unaffected. Being 
unaffected, unattached, and sovereign is his own being, he has 
infinite power and total agency; he can transcend matter by his will. 
This is one of the significant premises of western society and it 
provides a foundation for the Discourse of the Animal. Against this 
premise of a political subject with personal power, the Animal in and 
slipping through screen-bottomed pan has been measured by its 
detractors and supporters for the last two thousand years. By 
privileging an individualized political subject as the most ideal form 
on earth, second only to a perfected God (God’s vice regent per Islam,
steward per Judaism and Christianity, the apex of evolution and 
morality per science and humanism), all our discourses close out the 
possibility of an ecological being who is somehow an individual but 
who also belongs—who affects and is affected, a part and a whole— 
whose power rests in contributing to and receiving from its 
surroundings rather than being separate from them. Within the 
Discourse of the Animal, ecological beings (quite different from 
dominant definitions of political subjects) will always appear lacking 
or incapable of an independent relationship with deity or the state. 
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They will appear powerless when compared to the power of the 
political subject. 
Gathered around the screen-bottomed pan and its exclusionary 
line, the Discourse of the Animal may sound different depending on 
who is speaking for or against animals, but its premises are often 
similar to what I have described. On the one hand a negation: The 
Animal is not an agent, she cannot act politically, she cannot affect 
human existence or evolution, she cannot assume responsibility, she 
cannot speak in her own defense, she cannot choose, she is not free, 
she cannot exert power. And by this we subjugate her. On the other 
hand an affirmation: The Animal can be a political agent, she can act 
and even speak if we would only include her in our sphere as a 
political subject with personal power. And by this we seek her 
liberation. 
This is the extent of the Animal that remains trapped around the 
screen, whether the stones atop or the dregs falling through at points 
of penetration. To be or not to be a political subject is often the 
nature of the argument. The line we, who care about animals, are 
blurring is not really between human and animal. We are blurring the
line between human as political subject, and the Animal who we 
think should join us as a political subject, though admittedly a subject
with little power: Wearing the clothes we see fit, submitting to the 
laws we practice, sharing in the rights we have constructed, leashed 
and surgically altered to avoid reproduction, kept inside houses and 
apartments we’ve built, starring in our movies, living in our barns or
backyards, eating food that we provide, over-feeding and over-
breeding in the way customary for us. This Animal is brought into our
neuroscience labs so we can learn about human behavior and she is 
brought into our behavioral labs so we can learn about animal tool
use. She is brought into our churches to receive our blessing, 
captured under the expressions of our personal power. 
But lest we forget, there is still an Animal we haven’t found, like 
the elusive gold of my childhood creek, that is more than the stones 
atop the screen or the water and sand falling around us. And this 
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being has been more or less ignored. And frankly we don’t know 
much about it. We’ve never really gotten a look so we aren’t sure how 
it’s different from the Animal we see on our side—the one in the 
factory farm or the one in the flannel jacket at the dog park—and to 
tell the truth, we don’t even know what it might be called over there, 
if anything at all, or how it might affect us. 
But I suggest we leave the screen for a moment, along with the 
Discourse of the Animal rooted in the underlying premise of the 
political subject with personal power, and resume our search for gold,
if only for a moment, to see if we discover something more valuable 
about the many elusive lives we share this planet with. 
* * * 
Two-hundred thousand years ago, our ancestors were animals 
themselves, upright bipedal primates who walked out of the African 
forests that had withered during the Ice Age into the surrounding 
grasslands, vulnerable and exposed. They watched the activities and 
rhythm of other mammalian groups, observing and mimicking their 
techniques so that they might survive among them as hunter-
gatherers. This process of our brain-making required constant 
scrutiny of other animals (Daly-Olmert 2009, 3). Early Paleolithic 
hunters were far from the top predator, literally overwhelmed by 
herds of deer, early cattle, as well as the large carnivores. 
Outnumbered, outsized and outmatched in strength and speed, early 
humans were a precarious group watching and learning from other 
communities who were flourishing: How to move with the seasons; 
how to hunt as a group; where to get water; what fruit and berries to 
eat (Daly-Olmert 2009, 2-9). 
Where they lacked claws and sharp teeth, they developed spears
and daggers. Where they lacked the armor of other beings, they 
developed shields. Early humans mimicked the movements, the 
silence and the sounds of animals. In his book Singing Neanderthals, 
Steven Mithen describes how ancient tribes mimicked animals in
game, songs and dance, replicating their actions, calls, and physical 
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features in the length of a stride, the angle of a forearm, the turn of a 
head, the duration and pitch of a note (Mithen 2006, 168-71). 
Biomimicry has been the rule of our animal evolution with other 
beings, a blurring of identities that has shaped the brains and bodies 
of all parties involved. Early widespread cave drawings depicting half 
-upright human/half-creaturely beings, evidence of shamanic 
traditions and beliefs, show the centrality of this blurred identity, and
for good reason. As the twentieth-century Vedantic Hindu scholar Sri 
Auribindo put it: 
[I]n the animal, operations of a perfect purposefulness 
and an exact, indeed a scientifically minute knowledge 
which are quite beyond the capacities of the animal
mentality and which [the human] can only acquire by long 
culture and education and even then uses with a much 
less sure rapidity (Auribindo 2000, 88-89). 
In other animals we find a near perfect purposefulness; a 
knowledge that does not have to think itself because it just is. Our 
ancestors knew this well, so much so that not only did they observe 
and mimic animals from a distance, but they tried to become like
them, taking on the animal mind, as depicted in shamanic drawings
and Egyptian metaphysics. Animals were not allegory, fable, and 
myth as in our traditions. They functioned as individual ecological 
teachers in the natural world, embodied sages who taught us about 
the mutual relations of all the beings around us, something Darwin 
noted, in On the Origin of the Species that modern humans have 
“profound ignorance” of (Darwin 2008, 143). 
We tried to become like them and they also moved nearer to us, 
so that 40,000 years ago, in Europe, early humans began to associate 
with local wolves, cooperating in hunting, beginning the slow, 
mutually trusting activity of being domesticated by one another. 
Wolves could scavenge outside the dwellings of early humans and 
eventually moved inside to seek shelter—gradually, over 
generations—and humans slowly utilized the help of wolves—who 
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could warn off predators, help with hunting, provide warmth, carry 
loads and even supplement the food supply when necessary. 
The power in those relationships was necessarily shared, though 
perhaps not always equally. But the gaze went both ways—a four-
legged being was observing a two-legged being; the two-legged 
watching the four-legged—each coming to see the other as an 
advantageous part of their own group’s survival. When we consider 
how central the ecological example of the natural world and the 
animals within it was for the development of early humans, we can 
understand why Leonardo Da Vinci might have have warned, “Those 
who are inspired by a model other than Nature, a mistress above all 
masters, are laboring in vain” (Da Vinci 1883, 332). 
What comes next is not a seamless narrative, as few narratives 
are. About ten- thousand years ago, human animals assumed the
habit of living in more or less permanent settlements, and the lessons
learned from tens of thousands of years of mimicry would provide 
our ancestors the knowledge of breeding cycles, diseases and 
behaviors of young animals as well as knowledge of plant productivity 
so that agricultural technology could begin. For some cultures this 
manipulation of life was yet still a form of shared power, not yet the 
bio-power domination that it would one day become in western 
society under the Discourse of the Animal. In some remote places 
even today, agriculture means being attuned to the wisdom of an 
animal’s body. For much of the world, however, this attunement is 
lost. In fact, it was just rediscovered that cows, known and 
worshipped by the ancients for their ability to forecast weather, also 
have a magnetic orientation northward without need for a compass. 
They are the compass (Peterkin 2008). 
How much evidence of this perfect purposefulness do we need?
While we congratulate ourselves on the development of the iPod, 
other beings are coordinated instruments of relationship and 
environment. Whales, dolphins, and salmon navigate in the deeps 
when visual cues like the sun and stars are not visible, using 
something called magnetite, an iron oxide found in deep water which,
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as you might have guessed, is magnetic. Loggerhead turtle hatchlings 
orient themselves not long after birth to Earth’s magnetic field that 
guides them throughout their migration and allows them to return to 
the exact location where they hatched to lay their eggs. Coral reefs 
bloom with the timing of the moon; Canadian geese migrate with the 
seasons and the changing celestial sky, both without calendars. Rats, 
weasels, snakes, centipedes and dogs can detect seismic activity 
before it occurs (Kirschvink 2000). 
The beings who are not confined to the screen-bottomed pan are 
ecological wonders that cannot be quantified by discourses and 
arguments that constitute or even dispute them as edible, ownable, 
accessible, or controllable. Rather these beings are individuals who 
exist beyond these categories, often attuned to voices that we cannot 
hear, “gifted with,” to use to words of naturalist Henry Beston, 
“extensions of the senses we have lost or never attained” (Beston 
2003, 25). 
* * * 
I’d like to close by looking at a moment when our understanding 
of the Animal at the screen collided with our realization that there 
was something more to the individual beings under our observation; 
when those relying on the multiplicity of mechanisms and symbols 
that make up the Discourse of the Animal also glimpsed a glint of 
gold—a version of the Animal, whatever it may be, that still waits to 
be found. 
In the 1960s, Harry Harlow embarked on his controversial primate 
studies in order to demonstrate the necessity of love in social 
animals. It could only be humans who needed proof of such a thing. 
Yet, Harlow sought to disprove the psychological wisdom of the day 
that instructed parents to minimize contact comfort with their 
children from infancy onward. Prevailing thought suggested a brief 
pat on the back was sufficient to express care. Mothers and family life
were not viewed as essential to the healthy development of a political 
subject with personal power. Harlow, estranged from his own family, 
was intent on showing the scientific community that something 
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intangible and immeasurable, like love, indeed had enormous impact 
on the development of life (Harlow 1958). 
Rhesus monkeys were removed from their mothers at a few 
weeks of age and placed with two wire surrogate mothers. One 
surrogate mother was only made of exposed wire but offered milk. 
The other surrogate mother offered no milk, but her wire body was 
covered with a soft terrycloth. If it was food alone that drove the
infant’s behavior, it would make sense that the young rhesus 
monkeys would spend most of their time with the wire mother who 
had the bottle. On the contrary, the infants spent the bare minimum 
time with the bottle and the majority with the cloth-covered mother
whose softness they could cling to.
Harlow’s studies tested this in troubling ways, showing for 
example, that even when the cloth mother delivered a painful shock 
to the infant, the young monkeys would clamber back toward her 
softness and comfort. When left in a new environment, infants who 
were with the cloth mother would slowly explore the new space, 
returning as needed to the familiar safety of their soft cloth, exploring 
more and more on each venture. When the cloth mother was
suddenly removed, the rhesus infants would scream and curl up, 
rocking themselves, pulling their hair. The introduction of the mother
made of exposed wire with milk did nothing to calm their distress or 
reactivate their curiosity. 
It is so like us humans to project our disconnections on the lives
of other beings, to try and make them more human, so that we can
understand ourselves better. We relegate them to the brutal, the “red 
in tooth and claw” (Tennyson 1850), the mechanistic, the devalued 
instinct, the stupid, the body allegedly limited by its animal nature, as
we claim the ability to pursue the world of the gods, to take on the 
body of the gods, to transcend the mire of this material world of 
bodies, pleasures, pains, co-dependence and love. 
In the lab or the factory farm, in our companion animals, in pet 
shops, in zoos and circuses, in advertisements and on clothing, we are
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surrounded by beings who are victim to a Discourse of the Animal 
based on a political subject with personal power. We remove these 
beings from the vital maternal and ecological identities in which they 
are near perfect instruments of belonging and shared power. Yet even
still, as in the case of the rhesus monkeys, their wisdom shines forth 
in spite of the restrictions and limited expectations we place upon 
them. This wisdom and knowledge is available for those of us who 
have eyes to see or who bravely (if hesitantly) set aside our gaze so 
that we might "see" more rightly the relational wisdom—could we call
it love?—that we must have proven to us, but which other beings just 
are. In his “Four Quartets”, T.S. Elliot wrote: 
With the drawing of this Love and the voice of this Calling 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
Through the unknown, unremembered gate 
When the last of earth left to discover 
Is that which was the beginning; 
At the source of the longest river 
The voice of the hidden waterfall 
And the children in the apple-tree 
Not known, because not looked for 
But heard, half-heard, in the stillness 
Between two waves of the sea. 
Quick now, here, now, always—A condition of complete 
simplicity 
(Costing not less than everything) 
And all shall be well and 
All manner of thing shall be well… (Elliot 1968, 59)
Can we choose to forego the generalizations handed down to us 
about the Animal and instead remain oriented to the vast unknown 
realities of particular beings who contribute to and are shaped by 
particular relationships in particular environments? Can we accept 
that these particular beings are not much known because they have 
not been looked for, even as their bodies and minds are multiple 
expressions of the One life, spirit and truth in which so many of us 
long to dwell? Must we revert to the screen of exclusion and political 
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inclusion given to us by the Greeks, and the Discourse of the Animal 
surrounding it, while remaining blind to the pleasures, pains and 
relational knowledge of beings whom we so desperately need to learn 
from? 
The bumblebee at the crab apple blossom, the squirrel chattering 
in the oak, the dog at the foot of our bed, the spider in the garden, the
chicken on our plate, are not mere ornament or intrusion to human 
life. Rather, they are snapshots of resistance to the capture of their
bodies and ecological insight, as well our own. Reevaluating those 
aspects of our culture, tradition and habits that claim to blur the 
human/animal line—be they science and technology, animal behavior
studies, neuroscience, philosophy, religion and spirituality, our 
companion animals, our consumption, our contemporary animal 
rights—without the aid of the Discourse of the Animal is the challenge
for our time and it will be costly indeed. 
But it is only in doing so that we might truly discover what other 
beings can teach us and what we ourselves may be capable of 
knowing, doing and becoming when we liberate the bodies and life of 
other beings from the burden of our categories and language. By 
releasing other beings from our discourse, we may liberate them— 
and perhaps ourselves—in ways more fundamental than opening up 
every cage, though certainly, physical freedom is a logical result. 
In their bodies we see a relational life form with relational power,
a composite subject who exacts a cost and tenders a contribution—a 
key with a lock, an inner with an outer, a god with a world, a 
departure with an arrival, back where we started, knowing the place 
for the first time. 
When we look into the space deep within the eye of another being, 
whose language we cannot yet speak, whose sounds we cannot yet 
interpret, whose perspective we can only endeavor to inhabit, what is
it that we are looking for, listening for, half heard in the stillness? Oh,
that it would not be another word for our Discourse, but here, now, 
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always, a condition of complete simplicity—a glint of gold to lure us 
on. 
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